Since the Law Committee, Jean-Jacques Urvoas sent a note to MPs to explain the benefits of the bill on intelligence. Next INpact broadcasts its content.
Jean-Jacques Urvoas, chairman of the Law Committee and Rapporteur of the Bill on Intelligence, wrote a memo to the members of the majority particularly so to explain the charms of this text. While the project will begin its discussions today from 16 hours, the Socialist deputy tries in a game of questions and answers and arguments, we should find in the mouths of supporters this afternoon.
Mass Surveillance?
For example, the question “ can the services monitor everyone, all the time and everywhere? ‘, the Parliamentary replied that “ Statutes of the National Assembly Commission replaced deemed vague notions in the text of the Government and may give rise to broad interpretations (” national security “and” public peace “) by notions well known of law and clearly defined scope . ” Rather than mass surveillance, Urvoas prefer to recall “ the principle of limited monitoring to a few individuals who have a proven threat under serious motivations .” Only not mentioned detail, the seven goals that serve as justification for the deployment of weapons of mass surveillance, arguably, have been considerably extended during the parliamentary committee review.
As explained throughout our long analysis among these seven goals, we spent such a justification relating to the “ essential interests of foreign policy and the enforcement of European and international commitments of France ” to that of “ major interests in foreign policy and prevention of all forms of foreign interference .” Similarly, while the bill was “ the collection of information relating to the public interest “, the Committee recalls now, “ the collection of information relating to the defense and promotion of public interests “sentence followed by seven goals. Thus defined, this goal will allow not only a defensive intelligence but also offensive (the “Promotion”), validating a pro active intelligence for the benefit of French interests.
Another thing, monitoring may well be via mass the famous black boxes that will be used to anticipate a possible terrorist threat on networks. These are not people who will be snorted, but a greater flow of data to detect weak signals among ISPs, hosting and website publishers.
Controls more or less
Similarly, Urvoas considers the bill limited the use of exceptional operations, those justified by urgency, which then spend the least notice of the National Commission control techniques Intelligence (CNCTR). It’s true, except that in the amended version is no longer the prime minister who supports these operations, but a manager, the Prime Minister, occurring only a posteriori to eventually stop illegal monitoring .
CNCTR would otherwise have gained competence, always in the amended version of Law Committee. A relative competence since the silence of its President, following a request for an opinion expressed by the Prime Minister, worth again and again consent. Such a mechanism shows how the availability of CNCTR will be key, as the muscles of his means. Strangle its resources will lead to leverage authorizations granted by default or not preceded by solid analysis. Problem, the impact study is silent on the issue of public resources allocated to these operations.
The ballet antennas false
With regard to the IMSI-catcher, these false relay antennas capacity to aspire technical data or listen to phones passing in its spectrum, Urvoas also warns that the amended version of the bill “ only addresses [more] question of the device, but those data collected . ” In fact, the text in committee effectively abandoned this technical approach to wedge now on Article 226-3 of the Criminal Code.
This reference allows especially to legalize the administrative supervision over not only these false antennas but also any “ device ” or “ technical device ‘capacity to” open, delete, delay or divert arrivals correspondence or not to “or” to take note “or” to intercept, divert, use or disclosure of correspondence sent, transmitted or received electronically “. Clearly, if the reference to the Criminal Code governs this aspiration, it also deploys the same time a wider field of action.
Another advantage is the abandonment of the IMSI-catcher goes “ prevent the law is obsolescent when the technology will have advanced “adds Urvoas. It warns that these aspirations will now be allowed not only against terrorism, as in the original bill, “ but for espionage, organized crime or serious violence involving threats to public security, missions that are real concerns for the safety of our citizens . “
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